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THE PROSECUTOR: A MODEL
FOR ROLE AND FUNCTION
MAX FRIEDMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning with the now classic studies of DeLong and Baker in the
1930s, 1 an extensive literature has developed around the role and func-
tion of the prosecutor. This literature has concentrated largely on three
areas: the prosecutor's administrative function (decisions to charge and
the associated problem of discretion) ;2 the prosecutor's judicial function
(conduct at trial);3 and the general function of the prosecutor's office,
which has been described both impressionistically4 and statistically. 5
Because the literature ignores the multiplicity of vantages and their
interrelation,6 however, a comprehensive analysis of the prosecutor's
role is lacking.'
This article addresses the analytic void by describing prosecutorial
function from a variety of angles. Prosecutorial decisions which may
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Irving R. Kaufman, Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. B.A., 1974, Columbia College; J.D., 1977, Yale
University.
1. See Baker, The Prosecutor: Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
C. 770 (1933); Baker & DeLong, The Prosecuting Attorney: Provisions of Law Organizing
the Office, 23 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & C. 926 (1933).
2. Most of the literature falls within this category. For representative works, see F.
MILLER, PROSECUTION (1970); Mills, The Prosecutor: Charging and Bargaining, 1966 U.
ILL. L.F. 511.
3. See, e.g., Comment, Prosecutorial Misconduct-Recent Second Circuit Cases, 2
HOFSTRA L. REV. 385 (1974).
4. See, e.g., P. HEALY & J. MANAK, THE PROSECUTOR'S DESKBOOK (1971).
5. See, e.g., Oaks & Lehman, The Criminal Process of Cook County and the Indigent
Defendant, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 584.
6. The usual single vantage approach is exemplified by the studies of discretion.
These studies analyze discretion in terms of criminal justice goals and, from that perspec-
tive, either justify discretion as necessary in the interests of justice, see PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 133 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION];
Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 42 S. CAL. L.
REV. 519, 535 (1963), or suggest structures that limit its use. See, e.g., Note, Reviewability
of Prosecutorial Discretion: Failure to Prosecute, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 130 (1975).
7. A more complete analytical approach is found in Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion:
An Overview, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 383 (1975), but its scope is limited to discre-
tion.
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appear problematic when analyzed from any single vantage can be
understood more fully when viewed from a number of perspectives. Two
highly visible and controversial prosecutorial decisions, the acceptance
of Spiro Agnew's nolo contendere plea and the prosecution of Tokyo
Rose, are analyzed to demonstrate the utility of this approach.8
II. THE FIRST VANTAGE-THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY MODEL
A. The Functional Component
The prosecutor's office has recently been compared to an administra-
tive agency9 and the suggestion has been made that structures designed to
control agency activities are relevant to the control of prosecutorial
conduct. Two pertinent viewpoints which derive from administrative law
reflect variant methods of dealing with discretionary and often arbitrary
prosecutorial activity: the first looks to the administrative law notion of
'delegation; ' 10 the second to concepts of agency rulemaking and disclo-
sure. I I
Article I, section 1, of the United States Constitution vests all legisla-
tive power in Congress, presumably because Congress is a representative
and therefore democratically accountable body. Whether such deference
to the legislature is justified by the Constitution or by policy choice,
Congress must articulate its prerogatives before the executive may under-
take certain activities. When Congress delegates authority to an adminis-
trative agency, 12 that agency must act within the confines of its specific
grant of authority.' 3
8. This article does not attempt to resolve any discrete problems associated with
prosecutorial function. Yet, to the extent it suggests a procedure to analyze prosecutorial
decisions, it does have a discrete purpose. Two notable decisions were chosen for analysis
so that the various considerations are brought into greater relief. The analysis should
apply equally to everyday prosecutorial decisions.
9. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 109-14 (3d ed. 1972). See also K.
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); Abrams, Internal Policy:
Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1971); Note,
supra note 6.
10. The delegation doctrine has been in little use since the decisions in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Recent reliance on the doctrine has proven unsuccessful. See,
e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
11. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act §§ 3 (disclosure), 4 (rulemaking), 5
U.S.C. §§ 552, 553 (Supp. V 1975).
12. Certain legislative powers may be considered exclusive and not concurrent,
however, and thus nondelegable. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 41
(1825).
13. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 28-85 (1965). In
National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the
court struck down elaborate Department of Transportation requirements for labelling
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The correlates to the prosecutorial function are clear. For example, the
designation of certain conduct as criminal and the repeal of statutes that
proscribe conduct no longer deemed criminal, are legislative activities.
Prosecutorial action that falls outside the parameters of legislative author-
ity may therefore be viewed as impermissible. Although the prosecution
of nonexistent offenses does not create a significant problem, the prose-
cutor's refusal to enforce certain criminal statutes obviously avoids the
legislative mandate. The application of this vantage requires that inquiry
into the reasons for nonenforcement focus on this constructive repeal of
criminal laws, rather than on the nature of prosecutorial discretion.
Further inquiry should examine both the particular statute and the inter-
dicted conduct to determine whether the legislature, rather than prosecu-
tor, is better suited to perform this "legislative" role.
Another aspect of this vantage suggests that the prosecutor first deter-
mine his statutory authority and act only when clearly empowered to do
so. The prosecutor customarily makes several important decisions in
each case, 14 including what offense to charge and whether to accept a
lesser plea; when and where to initiate the prosecution and on what
theory; what position to take on bail; and, what sentence and probation
recommendations to make to the court. 5 Legislation would necessarily
govern each decision.
Extending this "delegation" vantage to its logical conclusion would
require a considerable reevaluation of the substantive criminal law. There
are presently too many proscribed activities to enable the prosecutor to
function effectively without exercising some degree of selective enforce-
ment. In addition, the legislature has failed to provide prosecutors with
guidance as to the manner in which they should pursue certain substan-
tive offenses.16 Thus, to employ this vantage successfully, the legislature
must reduce the number of offenses and substantially refine the elements
of particular offenses and the range of permissible sanctions. 17 Only
reforms of this kind would result in a reduction of the prosecutor's
significance, which would have broad systemic effects. If the legislature
erred, for example, in designating a criminal activity, the prosecutor
retread tires except those few markings that were necessary to comply with the congres-
sional mandate.
14. The range of prosecutorial decisionmaking is discussed in F. MILLER, supra note
2, and Abrams, supra note 9, at 1-3.
15. See Comment, The Prosecutor's Role in California Sentencing: Advocate or
Informant?, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1379, 1387-402 (1973).
16. It is unlikely, for example, that the legislature will instruct the prosecutor to ignore
certain offenses.
17. Even if the number of offenses was reduced, the prosecutor's discretion would be
a significant force if ambiguities remained to be construed.
Number 1]
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would be forced to prosecute this conduct and a participant, or actor,
further on in the criminal process (i.e., a jury) would be responsible for
remedying the situation.
The problem is not merely one of reducing ambiguities in the criminal
law, either, for its scope is institutional. Legislative reevaluation of the
grounds for prosecutorial action would force negotiation and compromise
on issues that are frequently delegated because of their political volatili-
ty. To be sure, two distinct perceptions are created by a prosecutor who
merely chooses not to enforce a certain statute, and by a legislator who
recommends the repeal of a statute and thus implicitly approves the
underlying conduct. This dichotomy is reflected in the dual role legisla-
tures perform in defining societal norms. First, the legislation may
prohibit certain conduct. Second, and more symbolically, the statute
embodies the community's legal standards, regardless of the enforcement
pursued. The legislature's repeal of any criminal statute may thus repre-
sent a response to the community standard function as well as a sincere
desire to remove sanctions from particular conduct.
The second rulemaking and disclosure perspective raises additional
questions about the decisionmaking structure within the criminal process.
In any particular case, there may be many reasons for a prosecutor's
decision not to prosecute. He may have doubts as to probable cause, or as
to the extent of harm. He may feel that the only available sanctions are
improper. He may be worried about the complainant's motives, the
victim's testimony, or the jury's verdict. He may personally approve of
the underlying conduct. He may desire to use immunity from one prose-
cution to further other prosecutions, or he may believe that a particular
prosecution will impede his career goals. 18 Similarly variant reasons will
support decisions to charge and ancillary decisions relative to the particu-
lar circumstances.
A prosecutor's decision not to prosecute because of the absence of
probable cause is most likely within the scope of legislative intent.
Similarly, evaluating the extent of harm prior to a decision to charge may
reflect values implicit in a graduated scheme of offenses and sanctions.
But discerning a scheme of prosecutorial prerogative from legislative
silence is, at the least, problematic. Even conceding that prosecutorial
action can be justified, a rulemaking and disclosure vantage would
subject these justification processes to public scrutiny. Prosecutors now
18. See Thomas & Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 507,
513-15 (1976); Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance
from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1148-49 (1973).
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are rarely required to explain their decisions or relate their rationale to a
legislative context.
The importance of rulemaking and disclosure derives from the need for
a coherent and evenhanded prosecutorial policy. Rulemaking also pro-
vides a basis for legislative scrutiny if, for example, legislators are
displeased with the prosecutor's procedures. This vantage requires the
prosecutor's office to propose and adopt rules that articulate the office's
,substantive' practices, the permissible reasons for deciding whether to
prosecute, and detailed procedures governing individual decisions. 19
Once a rule and decisionmaking structure is established, the second
level judicial structure, which would oversee the prosecutor's decision-
making in individual cases, could be superimposed. Ordinarily, several
perceived barriers preclude judicial review of prosecutorial action, in-
cluding the lack of an adequate record; 20 prosecutorial refusal to act; 21 a
reluctance to interfere with executive function; 22 and the absence of a
sufficiently interested party willing to contest the refusal. 23 The rulemak-
ing process disposes of most of these problems; the decisionmaking
process is regularized to produce an adequate record. The permissible
grounds for prosecutorial action and inaction are adequately detailed to
allow for judicial review. Finally, the separation of powers issue is less
acute because the court is not interposing its own standards, but is
insisting only that the prosecutor conform to his own. 24 The problem of
standing admittedly presents distinct difficulties, but congressional au-
thorization for private attorneys general may provide the remedy.25
This vantage would have other implications. The superimposed judi-
cial process, which would adjudicate the propriety of prosecutorial
conduct, would effectively shift the ultimate decisionmaking away from
the prosecutor's office. For example, suppose the prosecutor were per-
19. Cf. Administrative Procedure Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V 1975) (requires
extensive agency disclosure to public of both internal and external rules and policies).
20. See Note, supra note 6, at 139.
21. Id. at 134.
22. Id. at 136.
23. The standing problem is compounded by the Supreme Court's recent narrowing
trend. In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), for example, the mother of an
illegitimate child sought to enjoin the district attorney from declining to prosecute the
father of the child for failing to contribute support. The Court held that although the
mother had an interest in the child's support, prosecution would not result in support but
only in the father's incarceration, and a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution of another. Id. at 616-19.
24. Cf. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) (internal executive decisions unre-
viewable unless promulgated regulations circumvented).
25. Congress undoubtedly has broad authority to grant standing. See FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940).
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mitted to forecast jury reaction and use his assessment of that reaction as
a ground for prosecution. Through this rulemaking vantage, a challenge
to that decision, whether it was to prosecute or not, would require a play
within a play: there would be judicial scrutiny of the facts to determine
the probable subjective, or jury, assessment of the same facts.
There are institutional implications as well. The pressure on legisla-
tures to define offenses carefully would be lightened because the internal
rulemaking process would refine otherwise inadequate legislative
guidelines. Concomitantly, the legislature could satisfy its community
standards function by continuing to proscribe offenses which it no longer
sought to punish, presuming that prosecutorial rulemaking would lead
ultimately to nonenforcement.
These two viewpoints, delegation and rulemaking, are not intended to
be exclusive, although their implications provide differing insights. As a
predictive matter, it is likely that a restructuring of the criminal law to
provide standards for prosecutorial action would result from stricter
legislative guidelines and the creation of internal standards. The implica-
tions of this dual system cannot be articulated merely as a cumulation of
the implications of each function. Indeed, in a dual or mixed system, it is
unclear whether the prosecutor or the legislature would bear the burden
of justifying decisions that were reached jointly. For example, suppose
the legislature proscribed only those assaults that involved physical
injury, and the prosecutor determined that physical injury was to be
defined as injuries that required medical assistance. Does the individual
complain to the legislature or the prosecutor about the failure to prosecute
the assault of elderly women who are only "shaken up" and do not
require medical attention? The legislature made the initial, limiting
determination, but the prosecutor's office may be more accessible, par-
ticularly if it has standardized procedures for citizen input.
Additional problems in considering the implications of a mixed system
reflect the geometric complexity of drawing those implications. For
example, the diverse character of persons who would respond to pro-
posed prosecutorial rules as opposed to legislative enactments and the
varying degree of information possessed by each group presents an
institutional audience issue. 26 Prosecutorial rulemaking procedures, if
public, will be dominated by those with special knowledge and interest in
26. Group differences are reflected in court decisions that create standards for citizen
input. In administrative proceedings, the question is whether the proper parties, those
with explicit interests, have been heard. See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch,
307 F. Supp. 858, 862 (D. Del. 1970). Legislative input is generally a question of the proper
constituency, at least since Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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the criminal law and its processes. Legislative proposals, on the other
hand, would elicit a broader public reaction. The result of this group
interaction is by no means certain.
It is clear that prosecutorial function cannot be instantly refashioned.
The order of reforms may affect the response to them, and the order of
the response may in turn affect the reforms themselves. When applied to
a mixed system, the allocation of stresses may well be a function of
whether legislative or prosecutorial guidelines are first enacted. This
temporal sensitivity is relative to the community's changing perception
of certain behavior, and their willingness to deem that behavior "crimi-
nal" at any given point in time.
B. The Personal Component
Another vantage by which the prosecutor's role may be analyzed is to
focus on the individual as decisionmaker, and to assess his academic and
professional preparation, biases, and personal interests, because they
affect his ability to function reasonably and independently. Although
statistical information concerning prosecutors' education and experience
would facilitate this analysis, none exists. Nevertheless, some informa-
tion can be deduced from the existing "impressionist" literature, and its
implications can be considered in relation to the due process required of
independent decisionmakers.27
Prosecutors are licensed attorneys; there is usually no requirement of
specialized or continuing education. 28 The level of experience varies
widely among prosecutors and there is no consensus as to which prosecu-
torial functions demand experience. Thus in Manhattan, an inexperienc-
ed prosecutor will handle the original charge decision; in Los Angeles,
where that decision is made a week or two after arrest, the prosecutor is
usually experienced. 29
The implications of this viewpoint would compel a study of prosecu-
tors' training and the assignment of prosecutors with certain experience
and education to particular tasks. Yet it is difficult to conceive of what
27. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824
(1972).
28. The training of a prosecutor is generally limited to his legal education and
whatever courtroom experience he has had. While this may meet the need for the
courtroom and trial aspects of the job, it does not necessarily prepare the man for
his administrative and law enforcement functions. Many young assistant district
attorneys are appointed without specialized knowledge of the criminal law or
experience in court or in the investigative and discretionary parts of their work.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 148.
29. See Abrams, Prosecutorial Charge Decision Systems, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1
(1975) (compares the prosecutorial function in Manhattan, Los Angeles, and Tel Aviv).
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this training would consist of (beyond crafts common to trial lawyers)
and what the optimal allocation of prosecutorial "expertise" would be.
Although the President's Commission on Law Enforcement suggests that
increased* prosecutorial quality would accompany the appointment of
more competent and better educated attorneys, the Report does not
discuss the nature or extent of that education nor define "quality" in that
context.3°
"Quality" could be measured by the number of errors at trial, the
number of overturned convictions, or the successful prosecution rate.
3
'
Each definition implies different "quality" goals, and education may
further a particular set of goals, but not others. For example, although a
prosecutor may learn about trial practice, that education is arguably
irrelevant to intelligent charge decisions32 which require a sensitivity to
community needs and goals.
The vantage of the prosecutor as an individual also requires a con-
sideration of bias, 3 which can be separated into two categories: those
situations in which the prosecutor may stand to gain financially from a
successful prosecution, and those circumstances that place the prosecutor
in a broader position of personal conflict. The inquiry prompted by the
first category is obvious; the second introduces a variety of possible
problem sources. The prosecutor may be related to the witnesses, the
judge or opposing counsel. A judgment may affect his personal life. A
conflict may arise from the method of his selection-a responsibility to
legislative standards, and personal loyalties to the person who appointed
him.3 4
There are less obvious ways in which the prosecutor may encounter
personal dilemmas. Prosecutorial performance may conflict with career
interests. Certain cases (the prosecution of notorious underworld figures,
for example) may advance the prosecutor's career and may therefore be
pursued more readily than others even though insufficient cause exists
and the probability of obtaining a conviction is slight. The prosecutor's
perception of the seriousness of certain offenses provides other inconsis-
tencies. He may, for example, prosecute instances of breaking and
30. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 148.
31. The use of variant criteria to determine the quality of prosecutorial functions will
inevitably lead to variant conclusions. See Abrams, supra note 29, at 49-55.
32. See note 28 supra.
33. This vantage deals with bias types, not with methods for its control, which is
properly within the scope of the vantage that considers the prosecutor's office as a
bureaucratic structure.
34. The prosecutor may, of course, be directly elected by the people. See, e.g., 11
N.Y. CouNTrv LAW § 926 (McKinney 1972).
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entering because those offenses occur with frequency near his residence.
He may refuse to enforce laws against homosexual activity because of his
own homosexual tendencies. His socio-economic status may provide the
basis for a pervasive skewing in the persons he chooses to prosecute and
the offenses he finds objectionable.3 5 On any of these grounds, a prose-
cutor may decide not to charge but, more importantly, if he chooses to
proceed, his predisposition may color his performance.
The bias and interest viewpoint provides a microcosm of the prosecu-
tor's world. Process values, institutional values, and community values
are internalized by the prosecutor, and are reflected only by his expres-
sion of other, independent values and perceptions. Because of this
complexity, the viewpoint may serve only as the basis for a study of the
clearest forms of personal conflict. Characterizing the complexity of bias
and pointing out the difficulty of using it as a locus for analysis is relative
to the difficulty of drawing meaningful distinctions with respect to its source
and nature. The prosecutor's bias may be a mere reflection of values
established by the legislature, by his office, or by the process itself; yet
those values may be functionally equivalent to values held independently by
the prosecutor. For example, it is unclear whether discriminatory values
inherent in the process are sufficient justification for prosecutorial bias; yet
it is equally unclear whether the answer to that inquiry should be affected by
the prosecutor's own views. In addition, the prosecutor may be judged by
whether his own preconceptions correspond to those of his dominant constit-
uency36-a measure which evokes certain views as to the propriety of
independent judgment. Consequently, dealing with the person of the prose-
cutor leads to a series of questions about the intersection of individual belief
and institutional principles. These issues so involve the heart of the entire
system that one is tempted to suggest that the system as a whole cannot be
changed until the prosecutor's role is reconstructed; yet this temptation
belies the complexity of the task.
III. THE SECOND VANTAGE-THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
A. The Prosecutor's Specific Role
To analyze the prosecutor's role in the criminal process,37 a paradigm
35. One manifestation of attorneys' affluence is a noted failure to sanction white
collar crime. Institutional factors, moreover, may reinforce this oversight by imposing
conservative standards-for example, protection of the propertied class' property.
36. In this way, the prosecutor achieves a democratic justification for his actions
which, if he is an elected official, may be his primary object.
37. This vantage is similar to the one applied to police behavior in Goldstein, Police
Number 1]
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for that process is suggested; the subsequent observations, however, do
not mean to imply that there is necessarily a connection between any one
paradigm and the process' proper functioning. 38 The paradigm is mod-
eled after that in force in the New York City borough of Manhattan: 39
The police officer, usually in response to a complaint, apprehends a
suspect and brings him to the station where he records both the suspect's
and, if feasible, the victim's stories. The officer delivers the transcript to
the junior prosecutor who files charges or, if the offense is a felony,
directs the matter to the grand jury. The suspect is either charged, pleads,
and is held or released on bail pending trial or, similarly, held or released
pending a grand jury indictment. Either way, the release decision is made
shortly after police apprehension. If a felony charge is contemplated,
counsel may be appointed and another court appearance scheduled for the
charge after the grand jury has made its determination. In the case of a
not guilty plea, a trial will be held, judgment rendered, and possibly
sentencing, incarceration, or parole will follow.
There are many opportunities for the exercise of discretion. Following
initiation of the process, the police may not respond to a complaint or
may release the suspect;' the prosecutor may refuse to charge or may
later "nolle" the charge."' In particular instances, the prosecutor may
suggest that the individual be diverted from the criminal to a cognate civil
process.42 These actions result in the termination of process; still other
decisions, such as the level of offense to be charged, affect the character
of the process.
A theory of the prosecutor's role in the process derives from the nature
of his decisions. One mode of analysis is suggested in a study of police
functions which considers both process roles and the performance of
process roles in terms of criminal justice system goals ."3 That study noted
that the police can either invoke or refrain from invoking the criminal
process, and that the latter decision is of such low visibility that it often
Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administra-
tion of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
38. See Abrams, supra note 29. Although Professor Abrams contends that different
prosecutorial charge systems produce variant results, it is conceivable that these systems
could achieve a degree of efficiency measured, for example, by processing speed and
charge decision accuracy.
39. See Abrams, supra note 29, at 4-5.
40. See Goldstein, supra note 37, at 580.
41. See F. MILLER, supra note 2, at 312-17; Emery, The Nolle Prosequi in Criminal
Cases, 6 ME. L. REV. 199 (1913); Kosicki, The Function of Nolle Prosequi and Motion to
Dismiss in Connecticut, 36 CONN. B.J. 159 (1962).
42. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 134.
43. See Goldstein, supra note 37, at 543-54.
[Vol. 1978:109
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evades review. 44 In many respects, the prosecutor has a defining rather
than invoking role. The police officer's report reduces the invoking
incident to a verbal phenomenon, and the character of that report trans-
forms the incident by its use of legal terms. Yet the prosecutor has the
ultimate defining function, reducing the actual occurrence to a single
legal signification-naming a particular offense.
The authority to name the offense has significance independent of the
underlying fact situation. This is true particularly in circumstances in
which the facts are unclear and few individuals possess clarifying infor-
mation. The prosecutor's use of legal terminology imparts a certain
quality to the act which is not defined by the incidents preceding the
charging of an offense, but by the criminal processes to follow.
The defining function certainly affects all participants in the process, but
particularly defense counsel. Because the prosecutor controls a number of
relevant legal determinations by virtue of his charge, the defense counsel is
often relegated to a responsive role. He sifts the evidence mindful of the
elements of the chosen offense. This power of initiation and definition is
overlooked in typical analyses of the distribution of power. The presumption
of innocence places the initial burden on the prosecutor, but by defining the
offense, he shifts the justifying burden to the defendant. The plea bargain's
attractiveness is thus enhanced because it again shifts the focus away from
the definition fixed by the prosecutor to one formulated by negotiation.
Other process participants respond to the prosecutor's defining role as
well. For example, the jury may not convict the accused of an offense
greater than that which the prosecutor charges and the jury's verdict
limits the judge's sentencing discretion. Finally, the severity of the
offense significantly affects the penal authorities' parole determination.
The prosecutor's function extends beyond the charging decision to an
investigative role which creates further implications for the criminal
process. The evidence necessary to convict may never be uncovered if
the prosecutor decides not to investigate adequately. In this context, the
prosecutor's role closely resembles that of the police officer who chooses
not to pursue a complaint. In another distinct role, the prosecutor, as a
judicial figure, extends his influence beyond the capacity either to invoke
(through investigation) or define (through his charge) the process. For
example, the prosecutor's decision to introduce or suppress evidence will
affect the jury's determination of guilt or innocence-particularly if the
adequacy of prosecutorial definition is measured by the jury's concep-
44. Id. at 552-54.
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tions.45 The suppression of evidence will also affect the record which the
judge uses in determining an appropriate sentence. Moreover, eviden-
tiary decisions bear on the value of a right to counsel, modifying the
nature of defense counsel's role as an adversary. 46
The prosecutor's decisionmaking is even more significant when ac-
companied by substantial input into the sentencing decision. In Califor-
nia, for example, the prosecutor voices both sentencing and parole
recommendations. 47 He thus makes charge decisions which affect sen-
tencing and later refines that defining conduct by suggesting specific
sentences.
B. General Effects on the Criminal Process
The general effects of prosecutorial decisionmaking on the criminal
process are discerned from patterns of prosecutorial activity. As an
analytic matter, the validity of this vantage depends upon the pattern
information's availability to other actors within the process; different
decisions will present variant levels of visibility. While a cognizable
pattern may occur if the prosecutor chooses not to charge a certain
offense at all, a particular investigatory pattern may be far less visible.
Morever, those most likely to respond to these patterns, people who are
sufficiently aware of prosecutorial activity, are only a particular subset of
criminal process participants. The jury, for example, may not be influ-
enced by activity patterns because there is little reason to attribute to
them any familiarity with general prosecutorial practices. 48
Prosecutorial patterns have perhaps the clearest impact on legislative
activity. If the elements of a particular offense are inartfully drawn, the
prosecutor may be unwilling to charge that offense knowing conviction
will be difficult. Variant underlying fact situations that give rise to
prosecution for the same offense may indicate the existence of a gap in
the substantive law. In either situation, and in others, it is likely that an
awareness of these prosecutorial patterns will spur the legislature into
action.
Prosecutorial patterns affect defense counsel in a qualitatively different
way. Particular activity patterns may clearly indicate the feasibility of
45. See notes 51-53 infra and accompanying text.
46. See generally Rabinowitz, The Prosecutor: The Duty to Seek Justice, in VERDICTS
ON LAWYERS 231 (1976).
47. See Comment, supra note 15, at 1387.
48. Another possibility is that the process will not run its course or that the actors,
who are defined by their process roles, will nevertheless be motivated by independent
sources. A police officer, for example, may view harassment as an important process goal
and behave unaffected by prosecutorial conduct. See generally Goldstein, supra note 37;
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plea bargaining; others may suggest to defense counsel a waiting strat-
egy, allowing the prosecution time to initiate discussion of a reduction in
charge. The pattern of prosecutorial practice thus becomes a tool in the
dynamics of negotiation.
The judge's reaction to prosecutorial activity is part of a wholly
different dynamic. He may prescribe a certain sentence on the basis of
the charge, and not on the basis of the underlying conduct. After a period
of time, the severity of the charge may be a cue for judicial sentencing
behavior. Prosecutorial trial conduct patterns may also affect the charac-
ter of the judge's activity.4 9 A prosecutor notorious for introducing
questionable evidence at trial, i.e., hearsay, may find that the judge more
carefully scrutinizes his other tactics.
Finally, patterns of prosecutorial activity may influence the conduct of
potential and actual defendants. Following patterns of prosecutorial ac-
tion and inaction, individuals may alter their criminal activity or change
jurisdictions. Defendants' pleas may depend in part on the prosecutor's
reputation for pursuing certain cases; or on his tendency to recommend
lenient or stringent sentences. There is thus a temporal aspect to prosecu-
torial action-actions in every criminal prosecution affect subsequent
actors' views of the offense charged, and the possibilities of conviction
and sentencing.
C. The Prosecutor's General Process Role-Some Further
Refinements and Theory
A systematic way to measure the relationship between prosecutorial
patterns and criminal process operation would be through statistical
analysis. A sophisticated post-audit system could measure the rate of
rejections, dismissals, straight pleas, gross pleas, trial convictions, and
overall convictions.' In this way, actors' perceptions, particularly the
jury's, would determine the propriety of a charge. Empirical studies
could further refine the system by gauging the attitudes of actors later in
the process. For example, a study could determine the jury's willingness
to convict the defendant on a more severe offense than that which was
charged.
A control process model that dispensed with the prosecutor's specific
function is another device with potential to measure the effects of prose-
cutorial patterns. Under this system, the prosecutor would bring only broad
Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 904 (1962).
49. See cases discussed in Comment, supra note 3.
50. See Abrams, supra note 29, at 1387.
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charges that were defined by a wide range of conduct (e.g., "causing
bodily harm"). The jury would hear evidence relevant to this broad cate-
gory, and subsequently request instructions with respect to those offenses
they believed to arise from the underlying behavior and evidence. Their
verdict could include both the offense and the determination of guilt or
innocence. The series of determinations could then be compared to jury
determinations in analogous cases in which the prosecutor enjoyed his
traditional powers.
The prosecutor's criminal process activities have thus far been analy-
zed without refining their character. But suppose the range of the prose-
cutor's charging activity is divided into three categories: "charging,"
"plus charging," and "minus charging." This conceptual division
stems from a belief that in an ideal world,5 the criminal occurrence can
be defined within the scope of a variety of offenses. The proper charge is
the greatest charge the facts will allow; a "plus charge" is a charge
greater than the facts will sustain; and, a "minus charge" is a charge that
alleges a lesser included offense. The, institutional, legislative edict
instructs the prosecutor to charge at the mediate offense level.52 This
attempt at refinement, however, is not meant to attach normative values
to every charging level; rather, those values serve as the basis for
observations concerning other process participants and their reactions to
different charge levels.
The most severe process effects of minus charging occur when the jury
perceives that it has taken place, for there is little they can do to alter the
situation. The sanction issue normally is out of their control, but a minus
charge forces them also to label conduct criminal in a way which they
perceive to be inadequate. A striking example would be if a prosecutor
charged an individual with manslaughter, but the facts would sustain a
conviction for murder. The jury's perception of the inadequate charge
would lead to a swift conviction for the lesser offense. The judge is the
only person with power to counteract the minus charge. In some circum-
stances, he can impose a sentence more severe than is normally as-
sociated with the lower charge. But if the judge does not agree with the
jury's minus charge finding, the sentence actually imposed may be far
less than the jury would have recommended. One source of the problem
is the differentiation in criminal process functions which causes certain
actors to modify their behavior in anticipation of another's conduct. Thus
51. An ideal world, for these purposes, is one in which language precisely reflects the
underlying reality.
52. The proper charge requirement may be read into the prosecutor's obligation to
enforce the law. See II N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 700 (McKinney 1972).
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the charge decision, made early in the process, not only affects actors
further on, but also influences the way those later actors predict the
behavior of others.
"Plus charging" results in less severe process effects only if the jury
has the power to convict on a lesser included offense. Absent such
power, the effects may be considerable. A jury may acquit rather than
subject an individual to a prison term that is potentially greater than their
view of the offense would dictate.
These patterns will have legislative effects as well. If, for example, the
jury is dissatisfied with the highest sentence it can impose, there may be
strong pressure on the legislature to allow greater sanctions for lesser
offenses. Moreover, a pattern of acquittals of persons obviously guilty of
lesser offenses than those charged, will create pressure for legislative
authority to impose lighter sentences for certain serious charges. The jury
will thus be able to convict without concern that the punishment may be
grossly disproportionate to the offense.
Patterns of prosecutorial activity will also affect defendants. Unless
the prosecutor has adequate control over both sentencing and parole, the
individual who has plead to a lesser offense may find his "bargain" is
not all that he hoped for. The problem is clear: If the prosecutor controls
the charge, should he not also control the other process aspects in
sufficient number to determine effectively an individual's fate? In some
respects, vesting the prosecutor with such power would destroy the
purpose of the present allocation of functions.53 On the other hand, the
plus charged individual presents a dilemma. Although the jury wants to
convict the defendant because they cannot conceive of allowing him back
on the street, they hope the judge will be lenient in sentencing. If the
judge imposes the maximum sentence, the prosecutor has managed to
deprive the individual, in large part, of the jury's determination of his
lesser degree of guilt.
This division of prosecutorial activity into "charging," "minus charg-
ing," and "plus charging" permits consideration of a broader perspec-
tive: the effects of prosecutorial activity on possible criminal process
goals-specific and general deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation.
Unfortunately, because of the absence of data indicating that the process
actors are aware of prosecutorial activity patterns, this discussion focuses
merely on possible avenues of inquiry.
53. The present allocation separates criminal process function much the same way
checks and balances operate on the broader, institutional level, and for primarily the same
purpose-to provide process actors with constant, interdependent, supervisory roles.
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"Plus charging" appears to be the greatest deterrent. If we assume the
behaviorist view that an individual is affected most strongly by temporal-
ly linked responses, it should follow that a pattern of severe charges
(perceived as such) would provide a strong deterrent to criminal behav-
ior.54 The behaviorist's contemplation of temporal proximity, however,
is such that the only probable effective deterrent is the criminal's actual
apprehension by the police. Moreover, the knowledgeable criminal will
soon realize the "plus charge's" potential for enhancing his opportunity
for acquittal. Of course, the converse is true for the "minus charge." If
the individual is aware that the "minus charge" may facilitate his
conviction and is conscious of the substantially higher risk of incarcera-
tion, he may be more easily deterred by the possible lesser charge than by
the initial shock of a severe charge.
The question that arises with respect to general deterrence is whether
society is more likely to react to charges that appear inconsistent with its
perception of the underlying offense's severity or to those that create a
perceived equality between act and social sanction. The answer would
seem to depend on delicate psychological variables: whether the charge
seemed merely harsh, or so unrelated to the sanctioned criminal conduct
as to appear capricious. The general deterrent effect of "minus charg-
ing" raises a more difficult issue: whether society is deterred by swift
"justice" (assuming the "minus charge" hastens the process), even if
the "justice" is not considered equal to the crime. It should be noted,
however, that this analysis relies on a societal awareness of charging
behavior, an awareness which may not exist.
Rehabilitation presents other problems. "Minus charging" and "plus
charging" may create states of mind that are inconsistent with the
rehabilitative model. The "plus charged" individual who is ultimately
sentenced is demoralized; the "minus charged" individual, who receives
a lesser sentence than he should have, senses his good fortune and
anticipates his release without remorse. The simplicity of this paradigm
points out the difficulties of an analysis of the rehabilitative model from
the process perspective. The rehabilitative model is essentially personal
to the individual incarcerated and does not respond to the system's
pressures like general or specific deterrence models which are "act"
oriented. The rehabilitation question concerns how the totality of process
will affect the criminal's mind. The difficulty of answering that question
54. The underlying assumption correlates the severity of the stimulus with the charac-
ter of the response, an assumption apparently borne out by the literature on aversive
conditioning. See R. ULRICH, T. STACHNIK, & J. MABRY, I CONTROL Or HUMAN BEHAV-
IOR 303 (1966).
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may explain the futility of attempting to rehabilitate individuals through
manipulation of the criminal process.
Retribution55 presents the greatest dilemma because it brings into relief
the difficulty of defining an appropriate charge, whether by external or
internal criterion. Retribution, in the practical sense, is effected by an
appropriate finding (guilty/not guilty) and the imposition of an appropri-
ate sentence, as measured by one's peers. The retributive model is not
fulfilled to the extent that a "mischarge," which is determined from the
process actors' internal vantage, 56 prevents these appropriate results.
What is an externally defined "plus charge" or "minus charge," how-
ever, may not actually prevent an appropriate retributive effect. There is
no requirement that the jury find guilt or innocence on the basis of an
appropriate, externally defined charge.
Beyond the question of external or internal standards, additional prob-
lems arise because the charge decision itself is connected with variant
sanctioning qualities; for example, the more serious the charge, the more
onerous the trial and the attendant social stigma. These retributive effects
also must be considered in measuring the degree to which the process
achieves retribution. A charge that is not externally appropriate and is
internally so perceived thus may skew the process' retributive effect even
though the ultimate finding may comport with the above suggested
notion of retribution.
The prosecutor's internal vantage, as a theoretical matter, points out
the difficulty of attempting to understand the operation of any complex
system. Indeed, Llewellyn's instruction to the realists that they keep their
goals modest is well taken.5 7 Within the criminal process, although it
may be possible to analyze the effect of decisions to terminate process
(e.g., police decisions not to invoke and prosecutorial decisions not to
charge), the analysis of other actors' behavior is more complicated when the
action affects only a slight change in the process' operation. To demonstrate
the complexity, the following scheme may be viewed as the mere inception
of analysis. First, the character of the process actors' action must be
considered-is it consistent with or does it represent a departure from prior
norms? This possibility is the most difficult task because it requires the
55. Retribution has once again been recognized as a legitimate sanction motive. See
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). But the controversy over its validity is longstand-
ing. See Weihofen, Retribution is Obsolete, in J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITz, & R.
SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND PROCESS 715 (2d ed. 1974).
56. The jury's reaction to the charge presents the internal vantage.
57. See Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
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assumption of a normative posture, whether it is the prosecutor's common
practice or some other external "justice" viewpoint. Second, other actors'
expectations concerning the prosecutor's actions and the flexibility in their
expectations for aberrant behavior should be considered. Third, there should
be an attempt to describe the way other actors altered their behavior.
Finally, there must be a consideration of the process' long run alterations
and the degree of flexibility available in process institutions to accommodate
future nonconforming behavior.
A simple hypothetical reflects the inherent difficulties: A husband and
wife have an argument over his abuse of their child; twenty minutes later,
the husband, who has borrowed a gun from his brother, kills her. The
prosecutor charges manslaughter although the facts would sustain a
charge of murder. In prior, similar circumstances, the prosecutor had
charged either of the two offenses. The jury believes a murder conviction
would have been appropriate and thus convicts readily on manslaughter.
The judge does believe that lengthy incarceration will be helpful to this
individual and sentences him to fifteen years, a light sentence for man-
slaughter. The lowest possible sentence for murder would have been thirty
years; parole is possible for a person who has completed one-third of his
sentence on good behavior.
The jury vantage is a reasonable starting point to consider the process
effect issues that arise in this context. The jury is presumptively dissatis-
fied with the outcome, but is effectively overruled by the decisions of
both the prosecutor and judge. They could petition the legislature, but
there are attendant difficulties. It is doubtful whether they could muster
the concerted strength necessary to evoke an adequate legislative re-
sponse. The jury's ends would not be served by a mere redrafting of the
murder and manslaughter statutes, unless the legislature also removed all
prosecutorial discretion. They could suggest changes in the sentencing
structure, but still the judge may exercise his authority to foreclose any
effective jury input. They could voice their displeasure to the prosecutor
directly, but a change in his behavior is unlikely, particularly in light of
his recent successful prosecution. Although he may be made aware of the
jury's displeasure by their prompt, almost automatic, guilty verdict, it is
conceivable that he will attribute the jury's behavior to his intelligent
charge selection.
Doubts remain as to whether the criminal process will change to
accomodate this perceived displeasure. The adoption of a normative
stance, which delineates both the appropriate allocation of pressures
between those actors, will help determine whether the process is design-
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ed to avoid this degree of dissatisfaction. It is unlikely that focusing on
one process actor will provide the analytic intensity that is required.
IV. THE THIRD VANTAGE-SEPARATION OF POWERS:
AUTHORITY, IMMUNITY, AND CONTROL
The prosecutor, perhaps more than any other individual in the criminal
process, maintains a relationship with all three branches of government.
He enforces a legislative enactment-the criminal code-and his office is
customarily a legislative creation.5 8
The normal scope of empowering statutes is limited. The New York
Code, for example, provides for an office of the prosecutor and defines
his duties as the prosecution of all crimes and offenses cognizable in the
county of his jurisdiction.5 9 It requires the prosecutor to keep records of
his pending cases and to turn over any payments, fines or otherwise, to
the treasury within thirty days.' Other provisions provide for (a) a
special district attorney when the regular district attorney is disenabled
from properly performing his job;61 (b) the appointment of assistant
attorneys; 62 (c) the employment of outside counsel when the complexity
of the case requires it; 63 and (d) the defraying of special expenses
associated with the pursuit of criminal trials.' Apart from these broad
guidelines, the internal operation of the office is within the prosecuting
attorney's jurisdiction.
This remaining area is generally considered one of executive func-
tion,65 a designation that reflects the executive appointment of the prose-
cutor. On the federal level, for example, the President appoints the
Attorney General who, in turn, appoints his assistants. Courts recognize
the essentially executive character of the prosecutor's office and, in
United States v. Cox, 66 it was held inappropriate to review the prosecu-
tor's decisions not to pursue certain indictments. The court reasoned that
the Attorney General was specifically accountable to the President and,
in the particular case, the district attorney had been acting on direct
58. This is true on both the federal level, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 541-548 (1970), and the
state level, see, e.g., 11 N.Y. COUNTY LAW §§ 700-706, 926-933 (McKinney 1972).
59. Id. § 700.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 701.
62. Id. § 702.
63. Id. § 703.
64. Id. § 706.
65. See, e.g., Note, The Use of Mandamus to Control Prosecutorial Discretion, 13
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 563, 570-71 (1976).
66. 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
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instructions from the Attorney General. 67 In Inmates of Attica Correc-
tional Facility v. Rockefeller,68 the court held that despite serious ques-
tions concerning the deprivation of inmates' civil rights, it would not
interfere with a decision not to prosecute. 69 The strongest articulation of
this separation of powers position, which uses the executive nexus as
authority for discretionary prosecutorial decisionmaking powers, is
found in Newman v. United States. 70 In Newman, Judge (now Chief
Justice) Burger was presented with the question whether it was a denial
of equal protection for a prosecutor to accept a lesser plea from one
individual, but not from another, when both individuals engaged in
similar behavior in the same incident. The court refused to find a denial
of equal protection, and held that the discretionary exercise of executive
authority was beyond the purview of judicial review.7 1 This suggests that
although not all judicial review of prosecutorial action is precluded,72 the
executive is a primary source of prosecutorial authority.
The judiciary provides the prosecutor with authority through its grant
of immunity. In Imbler v. Pachtman,73 the Supreme Court, after recog-
nizing the prosecutor's absolute civil immunity in the course of his
advocacy function, refused to reach the question whether the same
immunity applied to his role as an administrator or investigative officer. 74
In focusing thus on the prosecutor's duty to disclose information at trial,
Imbler concerns the adjudicative aspect of the prosecutorial task. This is
consistent with the First Circuit decision in Guerro v. Mulhearn,75 which
rested immunity directly on the prosecutor's quasi-judicial function.
Control of the prosecutorial function is also divided among the various
branches of government. The executive has a direct removal power,
which is generally broader than that provided by statute.76 Even if the
executive does not remove the prosecutor, he can restrict his power by
67. Id. at 171.
68. 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973).
69. Id. at 380-81.
70. 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
71. "Two persons may have committed what is precisely the same legal offense but
the prosecutor is not compelled by law, duty or tradition to treat them the same as to
charges." Id. at 481-82.
72. See note 81 infra and accompanying text.
73. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
74. Id. at 430-31.
75. 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974).
76. A typical statutory provision is N.Y. CONsT. art. 13, § 13. The executive's
authority to remove the prosecutor is broader in scope because of the political nature of
the appointment and office. The statutory standard requires serious breaches of conduct
for removal, but executive pressure will often lead to resignation without so serious an
offense.
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limiting the scope of his activities. The executive and legislative
branches together control virtually all the discretionary prosecutorial
authority.
Judicial control is more limited. The judiciary is generally unwilling to
interfere with prosecutorial decisionmaking, whether through a man-
damus action77 or by implying, through statutory interpretation, a right to
compel prosecutorial action.7" Individual constitutional claims alleging
unequal and discriminatory enforcement have generally failed. Oyler v.
Boles79 involved a West Virginia statute that provided for a mandatory
life sentence upon a third felony conviction. Invocation of the statute,
however, was within the prosecuting attorney's discretion. An individu-
al's claim that the statute required the prosecuting attorney to proceed
equally against all three-time offenders was dismissed. The Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff did not establish that impermissible grounds
underlay the prosecutor's exercise of choice and the discretion, written into
the legislation, was permissible.80
Judicial control of selective enforcement, though infrequent, occurs
most often when a particular statute itself promotes blatant discrimina-
tion. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,81 which did not involve explicit prosecu-
torial discretion, the Court held that a statute, facially reasonable in its
attempt to regulate the laundry business, nevertheless denied equal pro-
tection of the law because its primary focus was the Chinese population.
Challenges to prosecutorial activity must show a similar deliberate selec-
tion, based unjustifiably upon an arbitrary classification. In United States
v. Falk, 2 a Vietnamese War protester was prosecuted for failing to carry
his draft card. The court, adverting to Yick Wo, found a prima facie case
of improper law enforcement because there was a published government
policy not to prosecute violators of the card possession regulations, and
the purpose of the prosecution appeared to be to punish the individual for
the legitimate exercise of his first amendment rights.83
Judicial restraints on the prosecutor are uncommon in other situations
as well. Imbler represents the prevailing view that suits against a prose-
cutor alleging the unlawful deprivation of civil rights are generally
unsuccessful. The immunity recognized in Imbler, however, does not
77. See generally Note, supra note 65, at 581-91.
78. See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d
Cir. 1973).
79. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
80. Id. at 456.
81. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
82. 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973).
83. Id. at 623-24.
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protect all prosecutorial conduct which falls short of prevailing judicial
standards. In Dixon v. District of Columbia, 4 for example, the court
ordered the dismissal of a retaliatory prosecution instituted to pressure
the defendant into dropping charges against certain police officers. In
United States v. Paiva,85 the court refused to allow the prosecutor to
violate his agreement to drop charges which had induced defendant's
guilty plea. The court noted that it had the power and concomitant duty to
supervise the prosecutor's office "to the extent its [sic] uses the judicial
administration of criminal justice.''86
Of like import is McDonald v. Musick,8 7 in which the prosecutor
suggested he would drop charges if the defendant would stipulate that
there had been probable cause for his arrest. When the defendant refused,
the prosecutor moved to amend the complaint to allege resisting arrest.
The-Ninth Circuit held that the prosecutor's action approached extortion
and thus violated the defendant's civil rights. 81 The prosecutor's conduct
should be judged by the same standards that apply to a private attorney,
the court noted, which is in marked contrast to the treatment that accords
him judicial immunity. In Blackledge v. Perry,89 the Supreme Court held
that it was a denial of due process and impermissibly vindictive for the
prosecutor to raise the charge against a defendant at a trial de novo that
was ordered after an appeal from a misdemeanor conviction for the same
conduct.
These cases hold that prosecutorial misconduct will not be allowed to
undermine the operation of the judicial system, 9° particularly when
constitutional guarantees are involved. In those cases the courts will
attempt to differentiate functions and subject the prosecutor's judicial
role to stricter scrutiny.
There are additional important implications derived from the separa-
tion of powers' vantage. Questions arise with respect to the appropriate
relationship between sources of authority and control. It is clear that
while judicially granted immunity intensifies the prosecutor's executive
and legislative powers, the judiciary fails to exercise an equivalent
degree of supervision. Legislative control of prosecutorial behavior simi-
84. 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
85. 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969).
86. Id. at 746.
87. 425 F.2d 373 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
88. Id. at 375.
89. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). See 54 N.C.L. REv. 108 (1975).
90. For another case involving prosecutorial misconduct, see United States v. Drum-
mond, 481 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd on rehearing, 511 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir. 1975).
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larly lacks the degree of effectiveness that would correspond to its power
to authorize prosecutorial activities.
Courts carefully scrutinize legislative enactments that define interests
and sanctions, yet the prosecutor performs a similar (perhaps quasi-
legislative) function and judicial intervention is the exception rather than
the norm. Perhaps our institutions are incapable of adequately controlling
the prosecutor's conduct. The judiciary would appear better suited to
perform this supervisory function because the legislature may be limited
by its inherent political nature. The legislature may be able to effect the
first level compromises that are necessary to enact a criminal code, but
may not be able to monitor the activities of any individual actor within
the criminal justice system.
V. THE FOURTH VANTAGE-THE PROSECUTOR IN THE COMMUNITY
The prosecutor maintains a relationship with the community at large,
both in his dealings with individuals intimately associated with the
criminal process, i.e., witnesses, juries, defendants, and victims, and
those who might be deemed external to it. This view of the prosecutor's
function is contrary to a common one that portrays him as insulated from
the community by the police and subsequent process actors, notably the
jury. Indeed, the communitarian perspective is most often applied to the
police both because of their visibility and their pivotal role between the
community and the criminal process.
Community response to prosecutorial action is generally fact-sensitive
and, because it cuts through many possible theoretical formulations of
prosecutorial role, does not lend itself to easy characterization. The
vantage can be conceptualized nevertheless by focusing on three ways in
which prosecutorial function and community response intersect. The
first, which is process connected, is the prosecutor's relationship to the
victim. The individual victim who chooses to invoke the process strongly
reflects community sentiment by the very nature of the act. By initiating
this "defining out" process, 91 the victim necessarily makes assumptions
about community sentiment and support. That the victim acts as spokes-
man for community sentiment is more clearly reflected in apposition to
procedures which allow injured individuals to pursue statutory remedies.
These procedures indicate that strong underlying social policies will be
served by permitting the individual prosecution of essentially public
91. See A. FRANZ & S. HUGO, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC 212-23 (2d
ed. 1956).
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rights.92 The prosecutor's decisions to prosecute thus are a response to
perceptions of community sentiment. He alone is empowered to vindi-
cate community rights and, in a sense, stands in place of the victim of
criminal behavior. One can conceive of a system that allowed individual
victims to prosecute cases if the appointed prosecutor chose not to do so.
In the same manner, the prosecutor's relationship to the jury reflects his
attitude toward community sentiment. The jury ultimately vindicates the
original complainant and puts the imprimatur of community feeling on
his or her prediction. The prosecutor's guidance and courtroom disposi-
tion encourage the jury to that end.
The prosecutor's reaction to the substantive criminal law also repre-
sents a response to community sentiment. Each time the prosecutor
chooses not to enforce the law (assuming probable cause exists), he must
believe that with respect either to the particular defendant or, to society at
large, the community would rather not have those provisions enforced.
He is making assumptions about the perceived goals of the system.
Releasing a first offender because incarceration will not serve any pur-
pose imports a rehabilitative or deterrent model to the administration of
the criminal law. Whatever the justification, the prosecutor effectively
furthers his own view of the community's purpose in enforcing the
criminal law.
Community pressures brought to bear on the prosecutor's office create
the clearest intersection of prosecutor and community. While the prose-
cutor's office generally is insulated from public pressures, certain cir-
cumstances spur public reaction. These circumstances may be of a
continuing nature, like those which lead to a prosecutorial crackdown on
illicit sexual activity. A period of lax prosecution is followed by public
pressure to enforce the law, which soon changes to outcries against the
expenditure of limited resources. The pressure operates initially on the
police who are called to enforce the ordinance; arrests, however, effec-
tively transfer the pressure to the prosecutor.
The circumstances that elicit prosecutorial action are also of an extra-
ordinary nature, like those surrounding the Watergate affair. These
situations may lead to the appointment of a special prosecutor, which
reflects both the depth of public sentiment and the public's unwillingness
to provide enforcement agencies the opportunity to exercise their custom-
ary discretion.
92. See Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81 (2d Cir.
1972) (direct citizen action to collect statutory fines). See generally Landes & Posner, The
Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975).
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VI. THE ADOPTION OF VALUES AND THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY
In describing the vantages, this article has neither adopted values, nor
suggested a scheme of values that would facilitate comparison of the
vantages. But certain values inhere in the very choice of a perspective or
set of perspectives, and each vantage suggests a legitimizing value which
perhaps best expresses these ideals.
The administrative viewpoint, which considers the prosecutor both
personally and functionally, supports legitimacy in two ways. First, it
focuses on the personal legitimacy which evolves from trust in the
integrity and intelligence of the individual decisionmaker. This legitima-
cy is rarely separated from the institutional role; perhaps we trust the
President because of his individual identity, but more likely we trust him
because of his office. It is difficult to separate this form of legitimacy
from that which inheres in function and in office. The second form of
legitimacy, therefore, is best expressed in the structures designed for
authority and control. In suggesting that the prosecutor clarify the bases
for his decisions, we demand that he elucidate the source of his authority
and his position within the bureaucratic structure.
The criminal process vantage suggests a legitimacy grounded in a
notion of instrumental rationality-the prosecutor's actions lead logically
to some definable goal. When the prosecutor brings a charge on the basis
of his determination of probable cause, he initiates two processes. The
first is the one customarily thought of-the criminal process-which
tests the guilt or innocence of the charged individual. At the same time,
the other process actors test the accuracy of the prosecutor's charge
prediction, a factor to be considered in measuring functional perform-
ance.
The separation of powers vantage also suggests a structural legitimacy,
and questions of control and authority are pervasive. The legitimizing
roots are deeper than those associated with the prosecutor's office as a
bureaucratic entity, however; here they are fundamentally constitutional.
From this perspective it is not so important that a particular prosecutorial
action can be traced back to its power source, but rather that the branches of
government compromise among themselves to provide the prosecutor with
an operative structure.
The nature of the legitimacy ascribed to the community vantage does
not relate to a legitimizing process or structure but rather to an amorph-
ous entity. For this reason, two additional factors are relevant. First, one
must discern the causal link between the prosecutor's action and the
community. Second, and more importantly, one must analyze the precise
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"community," whether it be a group within or outside the process,
which is applying pressure on the prosecutor.
Beyond, yet in part because of, questions of legitimacy, certain nor-
malizing values attach to certain vantages. The normative position from
the administrative viewpoint requires that the prosecutor be properly
trained, unbiased, and act within some controlling bureaucratic structure.
The normative position in the criminal process vantage seems to be a via
media: The prosecutor should use the criminal process to determine the
guilt or innocence of individuals without circumventing the process
through plea bargaining, but the scope of process employment should be
limited by probable cause. The normative position with respect to separa-
tion of powers distributes authority and supervision among the three
branches of government; checks and balances is transformed into a
notion of coequality. Finally, the normative position for the community
vantage is that the prosecutor should be sensitive to the manifestations of
community sentiment. Within the confines of legislatively determined
criminal activity, the prosecutor should serve as a conduit for the expres-
sion of that sentiment.
There is no guarantee that the values expressed above will not influ-
ence the vantage application that follows. Nor is an overriding normative
position disclaimed-the greater the number of vantages that describe
and legitimize the prosecutor's exercise of power, the more intelligent
and appropriate that exercise becomes.
VII. APPLICATION OF THE VANTAGES
Both the decision to prosecute Tokyo Rose and the decision to accept
Spiro Agnew's nolo contendere plea have been the subject of controversy
and debate. It is suggested here that the antagonists in the debate are
antagonists precisely because they approach prosecutorial function from
different perspectives. If all four vantages were considered, more intelli-
gent decisions could have been achieved.
In August 1973, then Vice President Agnew issued a statement to the
effect that he was the subject of a criminal investigation being conducted
by U.S. Attorney Beall.93 Kickbacks allegedly had been paid by contrac-
tors, architects, and engineers to various Maryland officials while Agnew
was governor; certain campaign contributions also were at issue. On the
day following this disclosure, the Vice President announced that he had
no intention of resigning. 94 The investigation proceeded and on August
93. N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
94. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
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10, federal investigators subpoenaed Agnew's records of his two years as
governor.95 This and other material was given to a grand jury which
proceeded to indict a Baltimore County executive on thirty-nine counts of
bribery, extortion, and conspiracy. 96
During this period, Agnew discussed his possible resignation with
President Nixon.97 These discussions turned eventually to negotiating an
exchange of Agnew's resignation for a guilty plea to a minor offense. 98
Finally, a deal was struck: there would be no prosecutions for criminal
activity relating to the kickback schemes or campaign contributions in
return for Agnew's nolo contendere plea to a charge of tax evasion and
resignation of the Vice Presidency. 99
This agreement was formalized in three statements: 1°° one by the
Attorney General requesting that the court accept the agreement; one by
the Vice President; and one by the Judge. The vantage analysis will be
applied to these three statements.
Attorney General Richardson viewed the matter almost exclusively
from a communitarian perspective. He noted that the decision must be
"perceived [as] just and honorable, not simply to the parties but above all
to the American people," 10 1 and thought that providing information to
the national community would aid in that evaluation. But Richardson's
presentation of the information had implications for the integrity of the
process, particularly for the role of the jury, because he released informa-
tion that normally would be used in the process itself. Richardson
unwittingly reflected these ramifications when he noted that "this evi-
dence establishes . . . . "1 2-a statement which the jury alone was
entitled to make. Richardson also implicated the process to the extent his
statements reflected on the character of possible witnesses and the relia-
bility of their statements, i.e., "None of the Government's major witnes-
ses has been promised immunity from prosecution .... "o Richard-
son adverted to the process (and conflated the criminal and impeachment
processes) only to suggest that its purpose is to vindicate a defendant and,
95. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
96. N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
97. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
98. N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
99. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1973, at 1, col. 4.
100. All three statements were read in open court in the District Court of Maryland in
Baltimore, on October 10, 1973, and are reprinted in J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ, & R.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 55, at 573-76.
101. Id. at 573.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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if the defendant wishes to forego such vindication, communitarian inter-
ests must be considered paramount. By assuming this narrow view of the
process' accomplishments, Richardson ignored the community values
which inhere in the process itself. Finally, his failure to consider other
vantages and, particularly, his oversimplified treatment of the process
perspective was reflected in his willingness to suggest an appropriate
sentence. He thus minimized the process' importance in ultimately arriv-
ing at an appropriate sentence decision and simultaneously ignored the
process' extensive, underlying role differentiations.
In simplifying the process' inherent values, Richardson adverted nei-
ther to the character of the negotiations that produced the deal (an
internal, functional perspective) nor, except in passing, to the implied
separation of powers notions. 1°4 Both omissions were surprising. There
had been an obvious departure from the standard bureaucratic process in
the charge determination; Richardson had dramatically exercised his
internal authority and supervisory functions. There was also an important
degree of judicial abrogation to the executive.
Agnew's statement echoed and yet transformed Richardson's. He
agreed that the point of departure was the community vantage, but did so
in a peculiarly self-effacing manner, suggesting that community concern
was better spent on other matters. 105 He essentially dismissed process,
but instead found the grand jury as the one relevant point in the tradition-
al criminal process. He proceeded no further, and made it clear that any
hypothesis as to the process' result was unnecessary because he had
altruistically dispensed with the process itself. He failed to consider
whether the process might serve community interests.
Judge Hoffman's response was analytically more complex. He began,
from an internal vantage, with a discussion of the procedures that led to
the agreement, but lapsed quickly into the prevailing sentiment when he
spoke of community perceptions. He objected to the publication of the
evidence, not because it usurped an essentially process function, but
because it would have led to further community discussion. 106 He ad-
dressed the process itself bnly at the end of his opinion, by discussing the
propriety of a sentence rather than a fine.
The appropriate set of judicial considerations are more complex. It was
the judge's responsibility to consider the fact and manner of negotiation:
104. Richardson conceded that the Department of Justice acknowledged Congress'
power to proceed by impeachment, once the indictment had been returned. Id. at 574.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 575.
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whether the deal was properly made and whether the prosecutor's office
recognized the standards by which it was made. There is no reason to
dispense with bureaucratic norms without justification; there is no reason
the Attorney General should not be subject to standards in charge and
plea decisions. The court should have more carefully considered process
values in removing evidentiary doubt and vindicating either Agnew,
Beall, or Richardson. Some discussion of community in that context also
was warranted: the court should have considered whether the community
would best be served by an ultimate resolution of the dispute by the
proper process institution.
Independent of Agnew's political position, what are the process goals
in this kind of prosecution? What are the separation of powers effects?
Clearly passive concurrence in an agreement fashioned by the executive
branch for one of its own raises issues with respect to the balance of
power. Finally, there is the communitarian interest, which is represented
by a desire to swiftly resolve the matter. Apart from the question of
whether other means could be found to remove the uncertainty, i.e., by
appointing an acting Vice President, the court does not discuss the
community interests at stake.
Essentially the same issues arise in the Tokyo Rose case. 1°7 Iva
Toquino was an American living in Japan during the Second World War.
In 1942, she took a job as a typist with Radio Tokyo and became
acquainted with two prisoners of war who worked there, in charge of a
program called "Zero Hour." When they needed a female voice for the
program, which consisted of light entertainment and propoganda directed
at American forces in the Pacific, Iva agreed to be that voice.
After the war, Iva gave an interview about her job and noted that she
once broadcast the following line: "You fellows are all without ships.
What are you going to do about going home now?" 108 This line was the
crux of her subsequent trial on charges of treason. The United States
Attorney decided initially not to prosecute because it would be difficult to
locate the two corroborating witnesses required by the Constitution. 109
This decision was heatedly attacked by the public, particularly Walter
Winchell, who accused Attorney General Clark of laxness. The trial was
marked by the introduction of questionable evidence and a hung jury
eventually reached a guilty verdict following a "dynamite charge." 10
107. The discussion is taken from Legget, Tokyo Rose: Traitor or Scapegoat, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 5, 1976, § 6 (Magazine), at 56.
108. Id.
109. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 3.
110. In a "dynamite charge," the judge informs the jury of the case's importance to
the government and of the taxpayer's expense already incurred in the prosecution.
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The four vantages illuminate the decision to prosecute Iva Toquino.
Because the Justice Department controlled decisionmaking, Iva Toquino
was, in a sense, subject to double jeopardy. In normal circumstances, the
prosecutor uses established standards in reaching a decision not to prose-
cute, and follows that determination unless further evidence is adduced.
In Iva's case, there was no internal structure capable of reaching a
determination and no standards available to reconsider the determination
once made. It is also doubtful whether, in an office with articulated
standards for prosecution, only one of a dozen Tokyo Roses would have
been prosecuted. Selective prosecution does not seem appropriate to the
offense of treason. These two points denote a clear normative position.
They reflect nevertheless that the Tokyo Rose decision would have been
analyzed differently if internal, administrative structure had been con-
sidered.
The criminal process vantage requires a consideration of whether the
prosecution compromised process-related values. On the one hand, the
character of her prosecution threatened the process' independence; on the
other hand, an innocent Iva Toquino would have realized an important
vindication of her loyalty.
The separation of powers perspective sheds more light on the matter.
Perhaps prosecutions tinged by political controversy should be scrutinized
more carefully by the judiciary. The political, primarily executive, process'
mode of self-correction, however-the pardon power-counters the argu-
ment for stricter scrutiny.11 Moreover, if treason is a crime against the state
in its executive capacity as warmaker, executive and political controls are
expected. Yet both the legislature and judiciary appear to have abrogated
their responsibility in this case.
Finally, there is the communitarian perspective. There was a strong
community desire to see Tokyo Rose prosecuted; unfortunately, the
character of that community and whether it, in fact, represented majority
sentiment, was not analyzed. Nor was the role of people like Walter
Winchell analyzed to determine the proper community spokesmen.
Perhaps some methodical inquiry into community sentiment could have
been undertaken by the relevant actors. This care would have been
consistent with the fact that treason is a constitutional offense and thus,
unlike statutory offenses, reflects deep-seated notions of community
needs and desires.
111. Before President Ford left office, he pardoned Iva Toquino. See N.Y. Times, Jan.
20, 1977, at 8, col. 3.
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The final analysis of the Tokyo Rose decision leads to two fundamen-
tal perceptions. First, since community pressure was central to the
progress of the prosecution, that pressure should have been analyzed
more carefully. Second, the absence of internal bureaucratic structures
made the prosecutorial decisionmaking process susceptible to community
forces. It would be interesting to observe internal structures that were
designed for control purposes to provide for community input and, at the
same time, to ensure that the input did not altogether alter the decision-
making process.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Let me express, finally, a note of pessimism. The suggested structures
merely facilitate the articulation of reasons for prosecution and force a
person considering the validity of a prosecutorial decision to confront all
the elements. The structure cannot control the outcomes of those con-
siderations since that ultimately is a question of personal values. One
person may consider process values of the utmost importance; another
may feel that it is the prosecutor's job to follow popular sentiment.
Even more importantly, the following caveat is necessary: this is a
structure for analysis but not for the implementation of particular value
schemes. A person devoted to process may analyze decisions to consider
their process implications; it is much more difficult to use that analysis as
the basis for action that is designed to further any one of the enumerated
goals. The criminal law is a complex process that involves the intersec-
tion of many subsystems. It is doubtful whether even the most single-
minded individual, endeavoring to alter it, could do so successfully.
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